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WHOSE AMERICA? 
CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF 
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
OF THEIR LANDS. By Lindsay G. Robertson.1 Oxford 
University Press. Pp. 272. $29.95. 
HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND 
POWER ON THE FRONTIER. By Stuart Banner.2 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Pp. 352. $29.95. 
Judith T. Younger 
4 
"We can only grope to understand. " 
The 3.6 million square miles of land that we now call Amer-
ica once belonged to Indian tribes. Now Indian lands comprise 
only a tiny fraction of the whole, about 4%.5 This great land 
transfer has been and continues to be a source of tension be-
tween tribes on the one hand and federal, state, local govern-
ments and non-Indians on the other. It has also been and contin-
ues to be a fertile field for articles and books attempting to 
explain it.6 Two more books on the subject have now been pub-
1. Sam K. Viersen, Jr. Presidential Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Col-
lege of Law. 
2. Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. 
3. Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family Law, 
University of Minnesota Law School. Younger teaches first-year property classes, includ-
ing Johnson v. M'lntosh. See infra note 6. She thanks her research assistant Brandon L. 
Raatikka for his cheerful help and support. 
4. BERNARD BAIL YN, THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 131 (1986). 
5. IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' EsTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 4 (lmre 
Sutton ed., 1985). 
6. Johnson v. M'lntosh, the seminal Supreme Court case discussed infra, which 
defined Indian land rights vis-A-vis the American sovereign, commands the enduring at-
tention of legal scholars. A non-exhaustive Westlaw KeyCite search, conducted on Octo-
ber 20, 2005, yielded citations to Johnson v. M'lntosh in over 900 sources of secondary 
legal literature from the past two decades. See, e.g., Eric Kades, History and Interpreta-
tion of the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 LAw & HrsT. REv. 67 (2001) ( describ-
ing the case as a feigned controversy because the plaintiff and defendant had no overlap-
ping land claims); David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M'lntosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of 
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lished: Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispos-
sessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands by Lindsay G. Rober-
ston, and How The Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on 
the Frontier by Stuart Banner. Both authors are law professors; 
both books are well-written, but their views of the phenomenon 
they seek to explain are startlingly different. Professor Robert-
son blames the law for dispossessing the Indians of their lands, 
while Professor Banner blames government officials for failing 
to enforce the law. 
The story begins in 1496 when Henry VII, then King of 
England, commissioned John and Sebastian Cabot, father and 
son, to discover countries which had "been unknown to all 
Christians" and to take possession of them in the King's name.7 
The Cabots made two voyages of discovery in 1497 and 1498. 
John Cabot, along with four of his five ships, was lost on the sec-
ond voyage. In the course of the first, however, he touched down 
on the coast of North America-we don't know precisely where. 
He thus became the man who "gave England her American ti-
tle."8 The exact nature of that title and, incidentally, the title of 
the Indians who were already in possession when the Cabots 
made landfall was not clearly articulated until more than 300 
years later. The vehicle was the United States Supreme Court's 
1823 decision in the "great case"9 of Johnson v. M'Intosh.10 By 
then, of course, England had been succeeded as sovereign, first 
by the original colonies, and then by the United States. All three 
sovereigns adopted the same policy with respect to Indian lands: 
private individuals were prohibited from buying them without 
government consent. In a world where land speculation was the 
Mitchel v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 159 (1994) (characterizing Johnson v. 
M'lntosh as "historically and legally unsound," and arguing that it should be abandoned 
in favor of the Supreme Court's later decision in Mitchel); Dana G. Jim, Great Property 
Cases: Johnson v. M'lntosh and the South Dakota Fossil Cases, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791 
(2002) (discussing, inter alia, the pedagogical value of teaching Johnson in first-year 
property classes). There are a plethora of books on the general question of Indian land 
loss as well. See, e.g., IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA, supra note 5 (investigating various In-
dian tribes' efforts to obtain relief for past transfers); GEORGE C. SHATTUCK, THE 
ONEIDA LAND CLAIMS: A LEGAL HISTORY (1991) (tracing the general history of the 
Oneida land claim litigation); WILLIAM THOMAS HAGAN, TAKING INDIAN LANDS: THE 
CHEROKEE (JEROME) COMMISSION, 1889-1893 (2003) (describing the negotiations which 
took place during the late 1800s between the Cherokee Commission and Indian tribes in 
which the federal government purchased vast amounts of land from the tribes). 
7. SAMUEL EUOT MORISON, THE EUROPEAN DISCOVERY OF AMERICA: THE 
NORTHERN VOYAGES 159 (1971). 
8. /d. at 157. 
9. So it was called by the Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians 11. United States, 348 U.S. 
272, 279 (1954). 
10. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
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norm and everyone was a land speculator,11 the prohibitions did 
not succeed in preventing unauthorized purchases from Indian 
tribes. 
Among such purchases were those at issue in Johnson v. 
M'lntosh. The plaintiffs claimed through an organized group of 
land speculators ("the Companies") who, in 1773 and 1775, 
bought two large tracts from the Piankeshaws and the Illinois 
tribes without governmental consent. The Indians later sold the 
same land to the United States. The United States, in tum, sold 
it to the defendant, another speculator. From 1775 to 1810, the 
Companies unavailingly sought to get the approval of the appro-
priate sovereigns for their purchases. They turned to the federal 
courts as a last resort. The case came to the District Court of Il-
linois on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and on an agreed 
statement of facts. The District Court decided for defendant and 
the Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, it took the opportunity 
to lay out the governing principle that discovery and conquest 
gave England and its successors in sovereignty an exclusive right 
to extinguish Indian titles to land. Until this right was exercised, 
the Indians could continue to occupy the land they possessed. 
Lindsay Robertson's book, Conquest by Law, is all about 
Johnson v. M'lntosh. The author made the serendipitous discov-
ery of a trunk containing "the Companies' complete corporate 
records, compiled over more than fifty years-hundreds of 
documents ... never cited by scholars" (p. ix). The author uses 
this treasure trove to give us what he calls "the first complete ac-
count of the history of Johnson v. M'lntosh" (p. ix). Standing 
alone and allowed to speak for itself, this would have been a fine 
contribution to existing scholarship. Unfortunately, Robertson 
does not allow the facts to make the story. It is the import he as-
cribes to them that mars the book. 
Professor Robertson attempts to convince the reader that 
the discovery doctrine enunciated by Chief Justice John Mar-
shall in M'Intosh was responsible for the Indians' loss of their 
land. Marshall, he says, deliberately inserted the doctrine to set-
tle the claims of Virginia revolutionary war veterans who had 
been awarded warrants for land which had not yet been pur-
chased from the Indians. Marshall, according to Robertson, "had 
11. See BAILYN, supra note 4, at 67 ("Every farmer with an extra acre of land be-
came a land speculator-every town proprietor, every scrambling tradesman who could 
scrape together a modest sum for investment. ... There was never a time in American 
history when land speculation had not been a major preoccupation of ambitious peo-
ple."). 
244 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:241 
a lot on his plate" at the time-including "circuit riding obliga-
tions" and "a social life to enjoy" (p. xi)-and didn't fully grasp 
the implications of the doctrine. Later, says Robertson, when 
Marshall realized the danger, he tried to retract the doctrine in 
Worcester v. Georgia.12 It was then too late. Asserting that the 
discovery doctrine "led to political catastrophe for Native 
Americans" (p. x), and casting it as the culprit in Indian land 
loss, Robertson ignores the enormous non-legal pressures that 
were being exerted to make the Indians give up their land. 
Among these were the espousal by President Jackson (who had 
been elected in 1829) of the removal movement, which had al-
ready well begun;13 the insatiable land hunger of non-Indians; 
and the prevailing general attitudes that Indians were insignifi-
cant and inferior to Europeans.14 These non-legal factors would 
have resulted in the same outcome, even if the discovery doc-
trine had never been articulated, and even if the Supreme Court 
had characterized Indian title differently.15 Whatever the Su-
preme Court called such title-"fee title" or "the right to occu-
pancy" -the Indians would have been divested of it by some 
means. 
Robertson's conjectures about what was in Marshall's mind 
when he put the discovery doctrine into the opinion in Johnson 
v. M'Intosh, what he foresaw and failed to foresee, have to be 
discounted. Others have engaged in similar speculation about 
the late, great Chief Justice's thought process and reached dif-
ferent conclusions.16 What Marshall was really thinking is un-
knowable; there are only the facts of the case and the language 
Marshall used to decide it. The case was framed as an action for 
12. 31 u.s. 515 (1832). 
13. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF TilE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
445 (1965). In fact, even Thomas Jefferson "looked forward to removing all Indians 
across the Mississippi." Id. at 380. 
14. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WilliAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN 
LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CoNQUEST 231 (1990) ("(A] discourse of con-
quest, emerging out of a Revolutionary-era vision of the public good that did not include 
the American Indian, had settled tlte law of America concerning Indian rights and 
status."). 
15. See MoRISON, supra note 13, at 445 (discussing the "old-world process of one 
race or people pushing a weaker one out of an area tltat it wanted," which found justifi-
cation in the Old Testament). 
16. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 6, at 103 (asserting tltat Marshall enunciated a 
"broader rule" in Johnson titan necessary because tlte Chief Justice thought tltat "[a] 
more limited ruling would leave loopholes for future litigation"); Wilkins, supra note 6, 
at 167--68 (suggesting that tlte holding of Johnson v. M'lntosh reflected Marshall's desire 
for a "political/legal compromise"). 
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ejectment.17 The plaintiffs' land claims rested on the Companies' 
purchases from Indians in 1773 and 1775. These were clearly il-
legal and the Companies knew it. The defendant purchased from 
the United States, the duly constituted sovereign at the time. 
Thus Marshall's statement of the reason that the plaintiffs had to 
lose: "the Court is decidedly of the opinion, that the plaintiffs do 
not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts of the 
United States. "18 It is, after all, the sovereign who decides what 
the recognized objects of property are and the protected rela-
tions in them. In tracing the defendant's title back to England's 
discovery of North America through its authorized agents, the 
Cabots, he laid out the chain of title for all to see. The Indians' 
preexisting rights were not destroyed, 19 but only re-described as 
"occupancy." Ironically, occupancy became ~uite valuable in the 
"Courts of the conqueror"20 many years later. 1 
Similarly unfounded is Robertson's claim that when Justice 
Marshall recognized the damage he'd done with the discovery 
doctrine he tried to retract it in Worcester v. Georgia. That case 
was about the validity of a Georgia law making it a crime for 
non-Indians to live on Cherokee land within the territorial 
boundaries of the state without a license. Worcester and six 
other missionaries violated the prohibition and were sentenced 
to four years in state prison. The Supreme Court voided the 
Georgia statute on federalism principles. The case did not affect 
Indian property rights but dealt with states' rights, Indian sover-
eignty, and the convicted missionaries' "personal liberty.',n 
17. This kind of suit originated as a tenant's action to recover possession of land, 
but came to be the usual method of trying title to land (pp. 53-54). 
18. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 6Q4-..D5 (1823). 
19. In other words, Marshall did not characterize Indian land as te"a nullius-
unowned land. For more information on terra nullius as it applied to British colonization 
of Australia, see Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in 
Early Australia, 23 LAw & HIST. REv. 95 (2005). 
20. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588. 
21. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) 
(Oneida I) (recognizing a federal cause of action for wrongful possession premised on 
Indian right of occupancy); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 
(1985) (Oneida II) (holding that the Oneidas' land claim was not barred by statute of 
limitations, political question doctrine, or equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, or 
estoppel); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 165 F.Supp.2d 266 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd, 413 
F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005) (awarding Cayuga Indian tribe over $247 million in damages in 
land claim action before the Court of Appeals reversed), petition for cert. filed, 74 
U.S.L.W. 3452 (Feb. 3, 2006) (No. 05-978). 
22. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 562 (1832); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, 
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 735 
(1988) ("(T]he Georgia court's judgment against Worcester affected 'personal liberty,' 
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When "the opinion was said and done, the rights of Indian tribes 
occupied precisely the same jurisprudential state they had occu-
pied in Johnson v. Mclntosh."23 
Robertson states one of his aims in writing Conquest by 
Law is "to expose the process of judicial lawmaking in the early 
republic" (p. x). "The history of the Johnson litigation," he says, 
is an example of "collusion, fabrication, and manipulation of 
pleading rules ... as the plaintiffs' attorneys aggressively sought 
to tum deficiencies in the system to their clients' advantage" (p. 
x). In this statement are two basic charges: first, that Johnson v. 
M'Intosh was collusive, or a feigned case, and second, that the 
plaintiffs' attorneys acted improperly in carrying it forward. The 
first charge has been suggested before.24 Robertson reconstructs 
the factual circumstances of the case in attempting to substanti-
ate both charges (pp. 45-76). The plaintiffs' lawyers needed a de-
fendant who was a citizen of some state other than Maryland to 
make out diversity jurisdiction. They found William M'Intosh, 
an Illinois resident, who had claims to 11,560 acres situated 
within the Companies' purchases (p. 51).25 Robertson writes that 
more than land claims made M'Intosh a willing participant in the 
litigation; among other motivations, he had a desire to embarrass 
one-time friend William Henry Harrison, who had negotiated 
the Indian treaties which might be undermined by a judgment 
for the plaintiffs (pp. 51-53). Robertson conjectures that the 
plaintiffs "almost certainly also offered [M'Intosh] a share in the 
Companies as well" (p. 53), although he provides no support for 
that assertion. 
The case was brought in the newly created District of llli-
nois26; there is no evidence that the district judge was biased or 
otherwise interested in the outcome of the case.v At this stage, 
M'Intosh was apparently content to let plaintiffs' attorneys man-
age the litigation. Robertson insinuates that there was something 
not 'property."'). 
23. WHITE, supra note 22, at 732. 
24. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 6, at 99-101 (asserting that the plaintiffs and defen-
dant did not have overlapping land claims). 
25. In a footnote, Robertson traces the metes and bounds of the parties' respective 
land claims to show they are in fact competing (pp. 195-96). Eric Kades had asserted that 
there was never any overlapping claim between M'lntosh and the Companies. Kades, 
supra note 6, at 67. 
26. The plaintiffs' plans to bring it in Indiana failed because the district judge there 
had at one time been a paid agent for the Companies, and therefore had scruples about 
presiding (pp. 47-49). . . . . 
27. Of him, Robertson says only that his brother had roamed the ruece of plamtlff 
Thomas Johnson (p. 51). 
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corrupt about the submission of the matter on agreed facts, the 
pro forma opinion of the district judge and his decision for de-
fendant, but offers scant evidence for the proposition. He sug-
gests that defendant M'Intosh's failure to seek an appeal bond is 
further evidence of his collusion. However, besides his compet-
ing land claims, some other facts demonstrate the possibility that 
M'Intosh might have wanted a different result than the plaintiffs. 
M'lntosh chose his own legal counsel for the appeal- the 
prominent lawyers William Henry Winder of Baltimore and 
Henry Maynadier Murray of Annapolis-although the Compa-
nies paid them. Additionally, the defendant's counsel repre-
sented him vigorously at the Supreme Court; so vigorously, in 
fact, that they argued upon a legal issue that the plaintiffs' coun-
sel intended to moot via the stipulated facts (pp. 66-67). And, of 
course, the parties did not procure the result they are alleged to 
have commonly desired. 
If the facts do indeed make Johnson v. M'Intosh a collusive 
case-as Robertson notes was the contemporaneous assessment 
of some Washington observers (p. 74)-it takes its place among 
others which have been characterized in the same way, like 
Marbury v. Madison28 and Dred Scott v. Sanford.29 Indeed, "some 
of the most famous constitutional decisions have come in what 
now seem to have been collusive cases. "30 As to the conduct of 
the plaintiffs' lawyers, which Robertson characterizes as aggres-
sive manipulation of the legal system and exploitation of its de-
fects, that is often what lawyers do and what they are paid for. 
Attorneys commonly look for adversaries, pick their courts, 
carefully frame their pleadings and arguments, and take advan-
tage of procedural peculiarities of the legal system to further 
their clients' causes. Of course, they are not to violate ethical 
rules in the course of their zealous representation on behalf of 
clients. But the applicable ethical rules are those of their day, not 
28. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REv. 1235,1308-09 (2003) 
(discussing the probability that Marbury was a "made case," and implicating Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in getting the case before the Supreme Court). 
29. PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 83 (1949) ("No 
graver issue was ever decided by the Supreme Court than that in the Dred Scott case; and 
it was presented in circumstances which suggested that the Court had no business dealing 
with it at all."). But see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLmCS 251 (1978) ("There is no evidence of 
underlying political purposes, or of an intent to contrive a test case."). 
30. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65 
(6th ed. 2002). 
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ours. Ethical standards and norms have changed significantly 
since the early 1800s.31 
Professor Banner's book is a more balanced treatment of 
the Indian land transfer than Professor Robertson's. It devotes 
only twelve pages to Johnson v. M'Intosh (pp. 178-90), and 
claims that the Indian right of occupancy was already widely ac-
cepted doctrine long before that case arose (pp. 188-89). Like 
Robertson, Banner speculates as to Justice Marshall's thoughts 
when he incorporated the discovery doctrine into the Johnson 
opinion, suggesting that the Chief Justice wanted to establish the 
validity of state grants of preemption rights to land Indians pres-
ently occupied (pp. 180-81). The book's main thesis, however, 
does not limit its explanation of the great land transfer to a mere 
matter of the state of the law, but describes the transfer as a 
function of the law's enforcement or nonenforcement. The key 
to understanding the phenomenon, according to Banner, is an 
analysis of the balance of power between Indians and non-
Indians during the relevant time periods. Johnson v. M'Intosh 
remains the law today as it was in 1823. Nevertheless, some In-
dian efforts of the last sixty years to "get land back, or be com-
pensated for land wrongfully taken" have "been remarkably suc-
cessful" (p. 291). After citing successes like the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (which resulted in over forty mil-
lion acres and nearly $1 billion for Alaskan Natives), Banner 
notes that "[o]utcomes like these would have been almost uni-
maginable in 1900, and utterly inconceivable in 1800" (p. 291 ). It 
was "not a change in the law" (p. 291) which led to these 
achievements. Rather: 
It was a change in the relative political power of Indians and 
whites. From the early seventeenth century to the early twen-
tieth, the divergence between formal law and actual practice 
had been growing, as whites grew stronger relative to Indians. 
In the twentieth century, when the balance began to tip back 
a bit toward the Indians, they gained the power to force prac-
tice to move closer to the formal law. Lawyers and judges be-
gan taking their claims more seriously. Legislators and execu-
31. See, e.g., 2 ANToN-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RisE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
IN AMERICA '1J57 (1965) ("Prior to 1850, and for some time thereafter, the lawyer .... [was] 
concerned almost exclusively with 'the law' at the expense of 'the facts."'); Lindsay G. 
Robertson, "A Mere Feigned Case": Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy and 
Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 249 (discussing the prevalence and 
acceptance of feigned issues and similar procedural devices in eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century American legal culture); but see id. at 263 ("(It] seems to be that by 1810, 
the tide was turning against the use of feigned issues."). 
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tive branch officials began fearing the consequences. The law 
did not change, nor did the nature of the Indians' claims. 
Rather, those claims were now heard, and the law was now 
implemented, within a new political framework in which Indi-
ans could no longer be ignored (p. 292). 
249 
How the Indians Lost Their Land guides the reader from 
the early seventeenth century through to the present, exploring 
differences in Indian and non-Indian opinion, divisions in Indian 
and non-Indian opinion inter se, and shifts in federal land pol-
icy-from removal to reservations and allotment. At each turn, 
Banner shows dramatically how little the governing principle of 
Johnson v. M'Intosh had to do with what actually occurred. The 
author makes two other points that are worthy of note. First, he 
observes that the transfer of Indian lands have, for the most part, 
been consensual in form, if not in fact. Here he raises the knotty 
question of the meaning of "voluntary" (p. 50) and links it to the 
key concept of power. The Indians' early consents to land sales 
were more voluntary than their later consents to removal trea-
ties and even later consents to private allotments of formerly 
communal lands. The variable was the shift in power from them 
to non-Indians. Second, Banner makes the point that Indian suc-
cesses have been accompanied by a showing that the transac-
tions complained of were illegal when they occurred. These 
transactions did not have to be involuntary to be illegal. The ar-
gument, thought up by some ingenious lawyer, goes something 
like this: we sold our land; the law32 prohibited us from selling it 
without federal consent; we didn't have federal consent; the sale 
was therefore void; the land is still ours!33 
Professor Banner's discussion of the balance of power be-
tween Indians and non-Indians contains no mention of Indian 
gaming. In 2004, casinos on Indian reservations took in about 
$18.5 billion in gross revenues.34 This seems so significant an 
amount that it is hard to see how it could not affect the calculus 
of political power. Unfortunately, the Indian victory noted by 
Professor Banner in the Cayuga land claim case (p. 291) has 
since been overturned by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.35 
32. Nonintercourse Act, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1n 
(2005)). 
33. This is essentially the argument of the Oneidas in Oneida Indian Nation v. 
County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). 
34. NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING AssOCIATION, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACf OF INDIAN GAMING IN 2004, 2 {2005). 
35. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 {2d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. 
filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3452 (Feb. 3, 2006) (No. 05-978). 
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The basis for the reversal was the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 3 a case which, in turn, 
limited an earlier Supreme Court victory for the Indians. So, the 
sad story continues. It is certainly overwritten and perhaps there 
is not much new to add. Indians are still attempting to regain 
their land and non-Indians are still groping to understand. 
36. 544 u.s. 197 (2005). 
